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MOTIVATION
Australia, NZ leading the (non-Asian) OECD in 
government investment in nationwide FTTP networks
• despite recent adherence to OECD access regulation 
orthodoxy
Why?
What is effect on 
• competition
• regulatory policy?
HISTORY
New Zealand
• world leader in telecommunications deregulation (1987), 
corporatisation (Telecom NZ 1987) and privatisation (1990)
• ‘light-handed’ regulation based on Commerce Act and 
contractual undertakings (1990-2001)
• re-regulation beginning 2001
• interconnection, resale (regulated 2001/effective from 2002)
• bitstream unbundling (2004/2005)
• local loop unbundling (2006/2008)
• functional separation (2007/2008)
Ethos – initial pursuit of efficiency, giving way to pursuit of 
a more competitive market and ‘best-practice’ regulation
HISTORY
Australia
• Telstra corporatisation 1988
• three-tranche privatisation (1997-2006)
• industry-specific regulation 
• AUSTEL (1988-97); ACCC & ACA (post 1997)
• access regulation 1997
• local loop unbundling 1999
• accounting separation of Telstra
Ethos: classic OECD regulation – pursuit of competition 
paramount
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
Strong egalitarian principles
• rural connectivity a strategic imperative
• price equalisation 
• rural vs urban
• unmetered local calling (but per-call charge in Australia)
Government financing historically targeted rural equality
• Project Probe, Broadband Challenge Fund (NZ)
• funds reserved from Telstra sales (Australia):Networking the 
Nation (A$250 million1997); Social Bonus package (A$1 
billion1999)
2007-8 ‘SEA CHANGE’
Australia
• impasse between Telstra, Government re ‘cabinetisation’ 
investment
• FTTN becomes a Labour Party 2007 election promise
• ‘nation-building’
• tenders sought 2008 – none met specifications
• 7 April 2009 Government announces it will establish NBN Co 
to build FTTH network
• cost up to A$43 billion
• serving between 90% and 93% of Australian population
• terms agreed to A$9 billion ‘buyout’ of Telstra assets (Feb 2011)
• A$800 million deal with Optus to migrate HFC customers to NBN 
Co (June 2011)
2007-8 ‘SEA CHANGE’
New Zealand
• 2007 - Government and Telecom enter undertakings for FTTN 
network offering 20+Mbps broadband to all communities with 
more than 500 lines by end of 2011
• 2008 election National Party promises NZ$1.5 billion for 
nationwide FTTH network to be constructed under PPPs
• up to 33 regional firms (UFBCos) covering 75% of population 
• enabling a ‘step-change in economic performance’
• making NZ firms competitive with their overseas rivals
• tender process 2010
• four successful bidders – Telecom’s network arm (Chorus) – 70% of 
regions, balance to  3 regional electricity lines, municipal companies
COMMON ELEMENTS
Fibre companies must be structurally separate from retail 
operations
• Telstra, Telecom must ‘de-merge’
• regulation of copper networks will remain during fibre rollout
Political imperatives trump prudential policy examination
• nationwide network build (even though real infrastructure 
competition exists in many localities)
• no CBA
• no  competition policy assessment
• no ‘state aid’ prohibitions or protections/compensation for 
• unbundling entrants (both countries)
• infrastructure investors (NZ)
COMPETITION POLICY CHALLENGES
Regulatory policy orthodoxy
• objective is infrastructure competition
• access regulation/ladder of investment is path to infrastructure 
competition
• structural separation militates against nonprice discrimination
• but problematic if infrastructure competition already exists
Fibre NGNs
• fibre is ‘frontier’ broadband technology (copper, HFC ‘legacy’)
• may become dominant in the future (GPT dominance) 
• but in the present, is government investment to 
• hasten infrastructure competition?
• hasten fibre’s acquisition of dominance?
AUSTRALIAN POSITION
Unequivocal – ‘fibre is a nationwide natural monopoly’
One fixed line network
• fibre directly replaces copper
• subsidised network effectively eliminates competitive 
network investment
• monopoly ameliorated by structural separation, regulated 
access to Layer 1 & 2 products
Rapid substitution assured
• copper ripped up when fibre laid
But major risks from wireless competition
• Telstra has $9 billion ‘war chest’ and no fixed network to 
spend it on
NEW ZEALAND POSITION
????????
Investment to accelerate infrastructure competition?
• contracts to municipal, lines companies in 30% of market
• but one UFB Co is in Christchurch, which has infrastructure 
competition already (DocSIS 3.0 HFC, ADSL2+)
• and contract for Auckland (half the country by customers) was let 
to Chorus (copper line operator, no residential infrastructure 
competition)
Investment to accelerate fibre’s acquisition of dominance?
• access regulation on copper to remain nationwide
• low copper prices increase competitiveness, delay substitution
• structural separation inhibits rapid, co-ordinated substitution
• exacerbated by  regulatory exclusions
NZ REGULATION
Telecommunications Commissioner sets copper access 
prices
• legislated obligation to be cost-based
But fibre prices set by undertakings between government 
and UFBCos
• not cost-based, due to government subsidy
• presumably set so as to achieve the desired level of private sector 
investment from PPP partner(s) given uptake assumptions
• Commissioner enforces undertakings, but cannot set fibre prices
Fibre uptake determined by retail prices 
• but wholesale price arbitrage between networks outside of 
regulator’s control
• notably, cannot act against ‘anticompetitive’ subsidised fibre or 
increase copper prices above cost to limit the time that two networks 
operate together inefficiently
STRUCTURAL SEPARATION
End consumer substitution to fibre ultimately controlled 
by retailers
• some of whom are vertically integrated infrastructure 
competitors (HFC, wireless)
• incentives to prefer fibre sales over copper or own networks 
(incl. unbundling investments)  governed by regulated price 
arbitrage
• but no single ‘alternative network price’ against which to set 
fibre wholesale price
• ipso facto the ‘regulated fibre price will be (inefficiently) wrong 
regardless (as one price can’t suit all competitors)
STRUCTURAL SEPARATION (ii)
Network innovation inhibited by ‘equality of inputs 
obligations’
• fibre operator cannot ‘customise’ offers with individual 
retailers to accelerate substitution
• as per mobile networks (e.g. handset bundling to induce 3G)
Exacerbated if different firm owns copper and fibre 
networks
• copper operator would welcome lower (regulated) prices to 
prolong network life/extend revenues on that network
• unbundling entrants may co-operate to prolong own 
investment life (recover own sunk investments) 
Delays time at which fibre scale economies achieved
• inefficient if fibre truly a natural monopoly
PPP RISKS IN NZ
‘Capital recycling’ model
• govt pays initial build
• PPP partner connects residence, buys share from government
• further build-out funded by capital recycling from share 
purchase 
Government assumes initial risk
But PPP partner takes on risk when connections made
• connections made not necessarily equivalent to services sold 
by retailer
• consumer not ‘locked in’ to ongoing fibre purchase
• better price on copper => switch back?
• what if future LTE offer bests fibre?
• critical for low-volume consumers
WHITHER COMPETITION POLICY IN NZ?
Infrastructure competition?
Fibre is a natural monopoly?
• infrastructure competition will never emerge
Hard to infer any clear policy direction
• none has been articulated
But what about competition in the BROADBAND MARKET?
• customer dimension very important
• not all customers created with equal demands
And is competition a means or an end?
WHITHER REGULATION POLICY IN NZ?
Focus on wholesale market
Copper regulation policy
• open access, structural separation, overseen by 
Telecommunications Commissioner
Mobile regulation policy
• regulated interconnection, mobile termination and maybe 
roaming 
Fibre regulation policy
• open access, structural separation regulated by enforceable 
contractual undertakings
• effective ‘regulatory holiday’ until 2019
But where is BROADBAND REGULATION POLICY?
TENDS TOWARDS CONCLUSIONS
Australian network will achieve higher fibre uptake initially than NZ
• but at very high cost per connection (due to Telstra, Optus buyout)
• Infrastructure competition inhibited even when feasible 
• and real risk that targets will not be reached due to wireless 
competition
NZ uptake will differ between regions depending on ownership of fibre 
network
• fibre networks will struggle to get rapid substitution, especially where 
copper and fibre not owned by same operator
• dual networks will persist even when economically inefficient
• network buildout likely slower than anticipated
• Govt funds committed for longer or more money needed
IS THE ANTIPODEAN FUNDING MODEL 
USEFUL FOR EUROPE?
You be the judge
THANK YOU
Questions and discussion
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